Notes on Adorno's "History and Freedom" - Lecture 1
I've just started reading History and Freedom by Theodor W. Adorno. The text is based on transcriptions of a 1964-65 lecture series given by Adorno at Frankfurt's Institute of Social Research. The wisdom of the net deems them the easiest entry into his thoughts on his main work, Negative Dialectics; I hope the net is right, I keep running into references to his work and am curious as to why. Fair warning, I have absolutely no training in philosophy so read what follows at your own risk.
There were 28 lectures in all divided into three parts: History, Progress and Freedom. The first lecture is dated 10 November 1964 and is titled Progress or Regression? It's a bit of a mishmash as the original recording, the usual source of a transcript, is missing so the chapter is built from Adorno's surviving notes and those of Hillmar Tillack, a person who attended a lecture. The lecture raises a problem:
Adorno begins the lecture by telling us that history and freedom are to be treated as interdependent and "not as individual phenomena." (3) as we tend to conceive of them together. As proof he discusses earlier conceptions of the two.
Kant, Hobbes and Hegel
Kant's thoughts on history and freedom are "distilled" in his 1784 essay "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose". For him the "relation of the realm of freedom to history is mediated by conflict [Antagoninismus]" (3) with freedom the "here and now" that "arises" through conflict. In this he is similar to Hobbes "view of a war of all against all....the savage conflicts...that result in the famous contracts founding the states." (5)
To this, Hegel adds "cunning reason" and both conflict and reason are seen as the means to forward progress.1 Here "consciousness of freedom" is "spirit" objectively realizing itself through history to make freedom a reality. (5)
[For Kant, Hobbes and Hegel the only way forward is by conflict and possibly reason but for the state--not the individual.]
Spengler, Frobenius and the great swindle
Spengler and Frobenius both put forward cyclical organic theories2 of history that encompass the consolation of philosophy, the idea that individual suffering is the price we pay for being part of something greater with this something greater being the meaning that moves history forward. We are told that Spengler's and Frobenius's theories leave
[Kant, Hobbes and Hegel's beliefs that progress can only be achieved by conflict makes the consolation of philosophy a necessity; would people willingly suffer if they thought it would only benefit priests, kings, rulers?]
For Adorno, after Auschwitz, "all talk of progress towards freedom seem[s] ludicrous." (7). Here he is not only referring to Auschwitz but to the entire system it sprang from. He asks
[How can we possibly say the human race is progressing after such an event? How did we arrive at a place that allowed such an event?]
Here and Now
According to Adorno "[w]here a subjective interest, a consciousness, is absent there can be no freedom" (6) and where there is no freedom there is no authority. (7) We have become politically apathetic and conformist as the result of
We are told people today are largely "outer-directed", their character and actions are "guided by outside influences" (6). There is no "dialectic between [their] inner and external powers" and so people "conform." (6-7)
Adorno claims
If we believe that progress is only possible through Hobbes savage conflicts then, for our own sanity, we need3 to create a meaning for the conflicts and the meaning we have created is that of the greater good or greater being; we tell ourselves the suffering is justified in service of that greater good. And so we continue on, devising greater and greater conflicts and imposing more and more suffering. Which begs the question that ends the lecture:
1. Adorno says he "agrees with Liebrucks...that Hegel's authentic statement of this dialectical philosophy of history is to be found in his Logic and The Phenomenology of Spirit" (5) and not, presumably, in his Philosophy of History.(?)
2. Spengler and Frobenius both developed theories that compare the development of cultures to the growth and decay of plant life. Both men thought civilizations were subject to set laws; Spengler described his work as a "philosophy of fate" while Forbenius declared that man could do nothing to alter a culture's natural development. They both substitute nature for history [the greater good].
3. Adorno asks if we can have a theory of history without latent idealism; I've expressed it as a 'need' made necessary by the belief; just as we need a 'Fall' to explain an imperfect man in a perfect God's creation.
There were 28 lectures in all divided into three parts: History, Progress and Freedom. The first lecture is dated 10 November 1964 and is titled Progress or Regression? It's a bit of a mishmash as the original recording, the usual source of a transcript, is missing so the chapter is built from Adorno's surviving notes and those of Hillmar Tillack, a person who attended a lecture. The lecture raises a problem:
- "What is the relation of progress to the individual?" (4) Adorno says his "specific approach [to the philosophy of history] focuses on the relationship between freedom and the individual. This is in large part identical with the relation of the universal, the great objective trend, to the particular." (5)
- "What can it mean to say that the human race is making progress when millions are reduced to the level of objects?" (8) i.e. How can we say the human race is progressing after Auschwitz?
- "Can we construct history without committing the cardinal sin of insinuating meaning where none exists?" (9) i.e. without the need for the greater being of the consolation of philosophy.
Adorno begins the lecture by telling us that history and freedom are to be treated as interdependent and "not as individual phenomena." (3) as we tend to conceive of them together. As proof he discusses earlier conceptions of the two.
Kant, Hobbes and Hegel
Kant's thoughts on history and freedom are "distilled" in his 1784 essay "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose". For him the "relation of the realm of freedom to history is mediated by conflict [Antagoninismus]" (3) with freedom the "here and now" that "arises" through conflict. In this he is similar to Hobbes "view of a war of all against all....the savage conflicts...that result in the famous contracts founding the states." (5)
To this, Hegel adds "cunning reason" and both conflict and reason are seen as the means to forward progress.1 Here "consciousness of freedom" is "spirit" objectively realizing itself through history to make freedom a reality. (5)
[For Kant, Hobbes and Hegel the only way forward is by conflict and possibly reason but for the state--not the individual.]
Spengler, Frobenius and the great swindle
Spengler and Frobenius both put forward cyclical organic theories2 of history that encompass the consolation of philosophy, the idea that individual suffering is the price we pay for being part of something greater with this something greater being the meaning that moves history forward. We are told that Spengler's and Frobenius's theories leave
"poor unfortunate individuals with the consolation that they are part of a higher living being, which has the benefit of conferring some meaning on their otherwise pointless existence....[and] where pessimism [as] a general proposition,...implies that everything is fundamentally flawed, as Schopenhauer believed...[such belief assists] individual evil in the world...by arguing that attempts to change the world as a whole are doomed." (8)In fact, we are told that Spengler
"argues that the totality arises out of something internal to human beings, to the essence of humanity, without noticing that history is for the most part something that is done to people." (9) [emphasis added]
[Kant, Hobbes and Hegel's beliefs that progress can only be achieved by conflict makes the consolation of philosophy a necessity; would people willingly suffer if they thought it would only benefit priests, kings, rulers?]
For Adorno, after Auschwitz, "all talk of progress towards freedom seem[s] ludicrous." (7). Here he is not only referring to Auschwitz but to the entire system it sprang from. He asks
Has the "consolation of philosophy that the death of individuals is the price paid by the great movement of history...always [been] the swindle it is today?"
[How can we possibly say the human race is progressing after such an event? How did we arrive at a place that allowed such an event?]
Here and Now
According to Adorno "[w]here a subjective interest, a consciousness, is absent there can be no freedom" (6) and where there is no freedom there is no authority. (7) We have become politically apathetic and conformist as the result of
"[t]he growing concentration of the economy, the executive and the bureaucracy [having] advanced to such an extent that people are reduced more and more to the status of functions. What freedom remains is superficial....In reality [people] are only given free rein in limited activities." (3)This reduction to a function applies even a the highest levels, CEO's and leaders are as trapped within the system as everyone else. (6) Today people "may fear losing the opportunities [economic stability] for consumption" which "has displaced...enjoyment--[people] have become appendages of the machinery" [the institutional systems] (6-7) and have no "interest" in "expanding" their freedom.
We are told people today are largely "outer-directed", their character and actions are "guided by outside influences" (6). There is no "dialectic between [their] inner and external powers" and so people "conform." (6-7)
Adorno claims
"The concept of the autonomous human subject is refuted by reality....Where no freedom is experienced, there can be no authority." (7)We have lost the ability to differentiate between our real internal needs and the needs we've claimed as our own through exposure to outside influences. This has led to a political apathy and conformity to a system that promises economic stability and limited freedom at the expense of ourselves. If even the people at the top, the executives, the bureaucrats are caught in the trap of conformity, the status quo, then no one is really in charge. And, if I understand what Adorno is saying, the trap we find ourselves in is part and parcel of the way we think about history, progress and freedom.
If we believe that progress is only possible through Hobbes savage conflicts then, for our own sanity, we need3 to create a meaning for the conflicts and the meaning we have created is that of the greater good or greater being; we tell ourselves the suffering is justified in service of that greater good. And so we continue on, devising greater and greater conflicts and imposing more and more suffering. Which begs the question that ends the lecture:
"Can [we] construct history without committing the cardinal sin of insinuating meaning where none exists?" (9)Perhaps, if we stop looking for meaning in history, we might begin to think in terms of what progress could look like for individuals, since Kant's, Hobbes', and Hegel's conflicts and cunning reason leave alot to be desired as do the "natural law" theories of Spengler and Frobenius.
1. Adorno says he "agrees with Liebrucks...that Hegel's authentic statement of this dialectical philosophy of history is to be found in his Logic and The Phenomenology of Spirit" (5) and not, presumably, in his Philosophy of History.(?)
2. Spengler and Frobenius both developed theories that compare the development of cultures to the growth and decay of plant life. Both men thought civilizations were subject to set laws; Spengler described his work as a "philosophy of fate" while Forbenius declared that man could do nothing to alter a culture's natural development. They both substitute nature for history [the greater good].
3. Adorno asks if we can have a theory of history without latent idealism; I've expressed it as a 'need' made necessary by the belief; just as we need a 'Fall' to explain an imperfect man in a perfect God's creation.