ITTOL - Lecture 10 - Deconstruction
In this lecture, two essays in The Critical Tradition: Classic Texts and Contemporary Trends, Third Edition, David H. Richter, Bedford/St. Martin's, Boston, NY, 2007 by Jacques Derrida are discussed: "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences" (915-926) and "Différance" (932-949).
The first essay argues that Structuralism is flawed as, implicitly, every structure is built from a privileged position.
Derrida argues that the history of structure is really a series of centres; as if we've physically picked up the Eiffel Tower and moved it around Paris, claiming each new location to be the new centre. Each time we move the structure we give it a new name: essence, existence, substance, subject, myth, sign, etc. when all we've really done is re-organized our view of the same field. He also argues that each of these structures imply a presence or sense of being: there is something that exists outside of the structure and is, in some fashion, the cause of the structure and the new centre (as the centre and structure appear to be one and the same thing) i.e. there is something moving the structure around, re-centring it in the field. Derrida's problem doesn't appear to be with the creation of these new centres but with our certainty that each one is now the centre in some absolute way. He argues that they are better utilized as tools than absolutes:
Prof. Fry points out another argument Derrida raises with structuralism: it doesn`t explain how these centred structures change over time, how one gives way to another. Instead, structuralists identify themselves with cross-sections of time or history; as if these centred structures take discrete hops, rather than glide, across the field of literary history. According to Derrida, discourse has revealed both these structuralist errors as being inherent to the history of the concept of structure.
Derrida argues that in Nietzsche, Heidegger and Freud's metaphysical discussions we discover that a concept cannot be attacked unless we use use the same language the concept is built on.
In "Différance" Derrida argues that "...there must be a common, although entirely differant (sic)...root within the sphere that relates the two movements of differing to one another". A root that accounts for the oppositions we repeatedly run into when discussing concepts. He calls this root schema Différance claiming it "is neither a word nor a concept" (933) as it encompasses both the oral and the written and their oppositions; we don't hear the 'a' in differance, it sounds the same as difference, we only notice the two words, or signs, are not the same when they are written down. It also captures the change in concepts over both space and time.
The first essay argues that Structuralism is flawed as, implicitly, every structure is built from a privileged position.
The concept of centered structure is in fact the concept of a freeplay based on a fundamental ground, a freeplay which is constituted upon a fundamental immobility and a reassuring certitude, which is itself beyond the reach of freeplay. (915-16)You can freely investigate all you purvey but not the structure or ground you are standing on. Prof. Fry uses the Eiffel Tower as an analogy to structuralist theory: it is an open form and from its height one has a 360 view of Paris but the tower is also organizing your viewing field. If you stood atop Monmarte or the Arc de Triomphe you would have different views of the same field, Paris.
Derrida argues that the history of structure is really a series of centres; as if we've physically picked up the Eiffel Tower and moved it around Paris, claiming each new location to be the new centre. Each time we move the structure we give it a new name: essence, existence, substance, subject, myth, sign, etc. when all we've really done is re-organized our view of the same field. He also argues that each of these structures imply a presence or sense of being: there is something that exists outside of the structure and is, in some fashion, the cause of the structure and the new centre (as the centre and structure appear to be one and the same thing) i.e. there is something moving the structure around, re-centring it in the field. Derrida's problem doesn't appear to be with the creation of these new centres but with our certainty that each one is now the centre in some absolute way. He argues that they are better utilized as tools than absolutes:
...conserving in the field of empirical discovery all these old concepts, while at the same time exposing here and there their limits, treating them as tools which can still be of use. No longer is any truth-value attributed to them... (919)In essence, we need to stop using our current centred structure as the source of authority; in real terms, it has no more authority than earlier, or future, centred structures. The Eiffel Tower we're standing on and calling the centre couldn't exist if M. Eiffel hadn't thought to build it and place it where it is. Our view of Paris is pre-determined by Eiffel's actions even though he is long gone. And this is true of all centred structures or methods of organization regardless of how far they stretch their boundaries. If we stand on another tower, built higher than the Eiffel Tower and placed in another section of Paris we might see further but it is still a structured view; the structure is still organizing our view according to its form and location; it is, in a sense, offering us a a privileged position and lulling us into the illusion that we stand on an open playing field.
Prof. Fry points out another argument Derrida raises with structuralism: it doesn`t explain how these centred structures change over time, how one gives way to another. Instead, structuralists identify themselves with cross-sections of time or history; as if these centred structures take discrete hops, rather than glide, across the field of literary history. According to Derrida, discourse has revealed both these structuralist errors as being inherent to the history of the concept of structure.
Derrida argues that in Nietzsche, Heidegger and Freud's metaphysical discussions we discover that a concept cannot be attacked unless we use use the same language the concept is built on.
...all these destructive discourses and all their analogues are trapped in a sort of circle. This circle is unique. It describes the form of the relationship between the history of metaphysics and the destruction of the history of metaphysics. There is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to attack metaphysics....The paradox is that the metaphysical reduction of the sign needed the opposition it was reducing. The opposition is part of the system, along with reduction....there are many ways of being caught in this circle....It is these differences which explain the multiplicity of destructive discourses and the disagreement between those who make them. (917)We cannot discuss concepts without using the very language that describes the concept. The result of such discussion is the removal of privileged position; the lack of a true centre becomes readily apparent in the oppositions that arise. For Derrida this discourse is an event which has ruptured the "history of the concept of structure".
In "Différance" Derrida argues that "...there must be a common, although entirely differant (sic)...root within the sphere that relates the two movements of differing to one another". A root that accounts for the oppositions we repeatedly run into when discussing concepts. He calls this root schema Différance claiming it "is neither a word nor a concept" (933) as it encompasses both the oral and the written and their oppositions; we don't hear the 'a' in differance, it sounds the same as difference, we only notice the two words, or signs, are not the same when they are written down. It also captures the change in concepts over both space and time.
What we note as differance will thus be the movement of play that "produces" these differences, these effects of difference....we shall designate by the term differance the movement by which language, or any code, any system of reference in general, becomes "historically" constituted as a fabric of differences. (938-9)This is a difficult idea for me to grasp. I can only visualize it as ripples on the surface of a pond; the ripples are the effects of movement with neither the effect or the movement being distinct from the water's surface. The only problem is that ripples usually have a cause, something that sets them in motion and differance has no single cause, no presence. Derrida's description of differance as a root is also troublesome for me, even a root has to come from somewhere, it doesn`t just magically appear. Language comes out of something; people engage in discourse for a reason. Differance still looks, to me, like a privileged position; I`m still in the realm of 1+1=3.