ITTOL - Lecture 8 - Semiotics and Structuralism
In this lecture we're introduced to Semiotics and Structuralism, not because they are part of literary theory, but because they strongly influenced the development of literary theory. Semiology is "the study of existing, conventional, communicative systems" and semiotics is any language (means of communication?) composed of a system of signs. The concept was first developed by Ferdinand de Saussere, a Swiss linguist, although his work has had a stronger influence in the humanities and social sciences (if Wikipedia is to be believed) than linguistics.
According to Saussere, "Language is not a function of the speaker." Language is a tool we use when we speak. For Saussere, language is virtual, we infer it from speech just as Freud inferred the existence of the unconscious from consciousness. [Not sure if he means, by this, that language is only known indirectly through its effects.]
The way in which we use language (langue) he called parole. He saw langue as a set of possibilities and parole as possibilities realized over time. By this, I think he means all the langue available to us exists simultaneously in a virtual space and our speech reveals, in a linear fashion, a particular set of possibilities. So, every word I've written so far is drawn from the thousands of English words available to me (the full set of possibilities) and the process of me selecting, and writing each word in succession (over time) to produce this particular set of possibilities, is parole.
Saussere saw language as a system of signs that was both arbitrary and differential. Arbitrary because the sign we use, for example, a tree, brings to mind a real tree. The word/sound for tree is the signifier and a tree or image of a tree would be the signified. But their is no natural reason why the sign 'tree' should signify either a real tree or the image of a tree. If a natural mechanism was at work, if the sign 'tree' was connected, in a real way, to the natural world, it would bring to mind a real tree in every language and not just English.
Differential because we have to be able to distinguish between the signs found in any "communicative sequence". There is no natural connection between signs; nothing, in nature, that demands they appear together in a given sequence.
Prof. Fry uses the example of a red traffic light to explain Saussere's concept.
We see a red traffic light and we know it means stop. However, if we see a red light on the end of a reindeer's nose, we see it as a beacon. If we see a red light over a doorway in a red light district, we know it means come in. We know what a red light means according to the situation we are in; the context in which we view it. And we assign a meaning to it based on that context. If we happen to see a red light on a string of lights hung on a Christmas tree, we assign no special meaning to it because a red light on a Christmas tree is not the gross constituent unit in that semiotic system, the Christmas tree is.
When we are driving, traffic lights are a gross constituent unit in the semiotic system; if we don't know red means stop we could be in serious trouble. We can't, on our own, decide that a red traffic light, for us, means go. Well, we can, but we wouldn't last long on the road. This wide spread acceptance of a red traffic light being the sign to stop is arbitrary and conventional as is everything in any semiotic system. There is no overriding feature in the natural world that says 'red light' equals 'stop'; no law of physics that makes it so. We say a red light on a traffic light means stop by convention; we've agreed that is what it means. All semiotic systems are conventional; if they were not, we would not be able to communicate with one another. [This actually harps back to the classical concept of good writing. Writing can only be good if it uses conventional forms or patterns. Although one could argue that creativity is the art of creating new patterns (semiotic systems) which have the potential to become conventional; without that ability literature would never evolve. So, I would say any definition of good writing must allow for the development of new patterns within the writing.]
The use of a red light as a sign is also differential. There is no natural law that says it must be combined with green and yellow lights. As we've seen, it can stand on its own or with a multitude of lights, it can be, in combination or alone, a sign or not a sign.
According to Saussere we know what signs signify negatively, not positively, because we recognize everything they cannot signify in the given context. We don't positively know a red light means stop unless the situation we're in rules out every other thing a red light could signify. Prof. Fry says this is counter intuitive, I know I'm having difficulty with it as it's impossible to prove a negative, there is no way I can know everything a red light may signify so how can I possibly rule them all out? On the other hand, I positively know when I'm driving that when the traffic lights turn red it means stop and I know this because of the context, the semiotic system that I find myself in while driving.
Unless...is Saussere saying we cannot know, either negatively or positively, what a sign signifies or even that it is a sign unless we are aware which semiotic system it appears in? And we cannot know, positively, which semiotic system it is in but only those it is not in i.e. because we do not know every possible semiotic system, we cannot positively say "Aha, we are only in this one semiotic system!" Whereas we can say "Well, it's not this semiotic system, or that one, or that one, so maybe it is this one." In which case, we can only know what signs signify negatively. But by the same token, we also can't be 100% positive of what a sign signifies at any one time since we cannot be 100% positive we've ruled out every possible semiotic system in which the sign could appear as either 'a sign' or 'not-a-sign'. In effect, we choose the most plausible semiotic system and determine whether the sign signifies something or nothing within that system. Or we work through a number of semiotic systems and determine whether the sign signifies something, or not, in each one. [In this scheme, is there any way to know if whether one plausible semiotic system is to be preferred over another? One signifier/signified relationship that is more true than another?]
In earlier lectures we learnt from Heidegger that we first know signs as something and now, from Saussere, we know how we know them, negatively. In other words, it is a mistake to think that, because we first know something we know it positively.
And if a semiotic system changes, it changes both simultaneously and over time as new signs become conventional. At various points in our history, various signs were deemed to signify particular things. In some manner, the sign was added to the set of possibilities making up langue, and through its use (parole) it came to have particular significations. One recent example of this is Xerox, which came to signify a copy. If something is a Xerox, it's a copy of something else. The word Xerox was added to our language and over time was used to describe a copy and it ultimately became a sign signifying a copy. But before that could happen, people had to either implicitly or explicitly agree that Xerox signifies a copy. The sign Xerox entered the language in 1965, prior to that it was not in our langue, our set of possibilities; it was not available for use in speech. And the same is true for many new words that have entered the language in the last 50 years. It is also true that what signs signify can change over time, the word plastic signified flexible until the invention of plastics in the 20th century when, by convention, it came to signify a manufactured material. Plastic could still mean flexible but it was no longer used as a sign to signify flexibility; it's earlier signification was subsumed by its later signification.
Prof Fry, near the end of the lecture, says
According to Saussere, "Language is not a function of the speaker." Language is a tool we use when we speak. For Saussere, language is virtual, we infer it from speech just as Freud inferred the existence of the unconscious from consciousness. [Not sure if he means, by this, that language is only known indirectly through its effects.]
The way in which we use language (langue) he called parole. He saw langue as a set of possibilities and parole as possibilities realized over time. By this, I think he means all the langue available to us exists simultaneously in a virtual space and our speech reveals, in a linear fashion, a particular set of possibilities. So, every word I've written so far is drawn from the thousands of English words available to me (the full set of possibilities) and the process of me selecting, and writing each word in succession (over time) to produce this particular set of possibilities, is parole.
Saussere saw language as a system of signs that was both arbitrary and differential. Arbitrary because the sign we use, for example, a tree, brings to mind a real tree. The word/sound for tree is the signifier and a tree or image of a tree would be the signified. But their is no natural reason why the sign 'tree' should signify either a real tree or the image of a tree. If a natural mechanism was at work, if the sign 'tree' was connected, in a real way, to the natural world, it would bring to mind a real tree in every language and not just English.
Differential because we have to be able to distinguish between the signs found in any "communicative sequence". There is no natural connection between signs; nothing, in nature, that demands they appear together in a given sequence.
Prof. Fry uses the example of a red traffic light to explain Saussere's concept.
We see a red traffic light and we know it means stop. However, if we see a red light on the end of a reindeer's nose, we see it as a beacon. If we see a red light over a doorway in a red light district, we know it means come in. We know what a red light means according to the situation we are in; the context in which we view it. And we assign a meaning to it based on that context. If we happen to see a red light on a string of lights hung on a Christmas tree, we assign no special meaning to it because a red light on a Christmas tree is not the gross constituent unit in that semiotic system, the Christmas tree is.
When we are driving, traffic lights are a gross constituent unit in the semiotic system; if we don't know red means stop we could be in serious trouble. We can't, on our own, decide that a red traffic light, for us, means go. Well, we can, but we wouldn't last long on the road. This wide spread acceptance of a red traffic light being the sign to stop is arbitrary and conventional as is everything in any semiotic system. There is no overriding feature in the natural world that says 'red light' equals 'stop'; no law of physics that makes it so. We say a red light on a traffic light means stop by convention; we've agreed that is what it means. All semiotic systems are conventional; if they were not, we would not be able to communicate with one another. [This actually harps back to the classical concept of good writing. Writing can only be good if it uses conventional forms or patterns. Although one could argue that creativity is the art of creating new patterns (semiotic systems) which have the potential to become conventional; without that ability literature would never evolve. So, I would say any definition of good writing must allow for the development of new patterns within the writing.]
The use of a red light as a sign is also differential. There is no natural law that says it must be combined with green and yellow lights. As we've seen, it can stand on its own or with a multitude of lights, it can be, in combination or alone, a sign or not a sign.
According to Saussere we know what signs signify negatively, not positively, because we recognize everything they cannot signify in the given context. We don't positively know a red light means stop unless the situation we're in rules out every other thing a red light could signify. Prof. Fry says this is counter intuitive, I know I'm having difficulty with it as it's impossible to prove a negative, there is no way I can know everything a red light may signify so how can I possibly rule them all out? On the other hand, I positively know when I'm driving that when the traffic lights turn red it means stop and I know this because of the context, the semiotic system that I find myself in while driving.
Unless...is Saussere saying we cannot know, either negatively or positively, what a sign signifies or even that it is a sign unless we are aware which semiotic system it appears in? And we cannot know, positively, which semiotic system it is in but only those it is not in i.e. because we do not know every possible semiotic system, we cannot positively say "Aha, we are only in this one semiotic system!" Whereas we can say "Well, it's not this semiotic system, or that one, or that one, so maybe it is this one." In which case, we can only know what signs signify negatively. But by the same token, we also can't be 100% positive of what a sign signifies at any one time since we cannot be 100% positive we've ruled out every possible semiotic system in which the sign could appear as either 'a sign' or 'not-a-sign'. In effect, we choose the most plausible semiotic system and determine whether the sign signifies something or nothing within that system. Or we work through a number of semiotic systems and determine whether the sign signifies something, or not, in each one. [In this scheme, is there any way to know if whether one plausible semiotic system is to be preferred over another? One signifier/signified relationship that is more true than another?]
In earlier lectures we learnt from Heidegger that we first know signs as something and now, from Saussere, we know how we know them, negatively. In other words, it is a mistake to think that, because we first know something we know it positively.
And if a semiotic system changes, it changes both simultaneously and over time as new signs become conventional. At various points in our history, various signs were deemed to signify particular things. In some manner, the sign was added to the set of possibilities making up langue, and through its use (parole) it came to have particular significations. One recent example of this is Xerox, which came to signify a copy. If something is a Xerox, it's a copy of something else. The word Xerox was added to our language and over time was used to describe a copy and it ultimately became a sign signifying a copy. But before that could happen, people had to either implicitly or explicitly agree that Xerox signifies a copy. The sign Xerox entered the language in 1965, prior to that it was not in our langue, our set of possibilities; it was not available for use in speech. And the same is true for many new words that have entered the language in the last 50 years. It is also true that what signs signify can change over time, the word plastic signified flexible until the invention of plastics in the 20th century when, by convention, it came to signify a manufactured material. Plastic could still mean flexible but it was no longer used as a sign to signify flexibility; it's earlier signification was subsumed by its later signification.
Prof Fry, near the end of the lecture, says
From moment to moment, language changes, but if we're to understand it as language we have to honor its simultaneity. In that case, we understand it as a sequence of cross-sections rather than something that somehow organically changes through time. At each cross-section, people are either willing to use a certain sign in a certain way or they're not. That's the crucial thing: if they're not willing, the use of the sign doesn't work, which confirms the idea that nothing can be changed simply by individual agency in and of itself.People must be willing to accept the signification of a sign; if they are not, "the sign doesn't work". If people had not started to use the word Xerox to signify copying, the Xerox company could not, by itself, have forced the use of its brand name, Xerox, to signify copying. Proof of that, I think, is visible in marketing which spends a good deal of its time running branding campaigns. Marketing people know that for branding to work, people have to acquiesce to using the brand name and even with all their effort and dollars spent, not every brand name becomes a sign in the way Xerox became one for copying, Hoover for vacuuming, Google for searching the net, etc. In other words, we can use these brand names to say "I xeroxed you", "I hoovered", "I googled" and people will understand we mean "I copied you", "I vacuumed", "I searched the net". This is not true for the vast majority of brand names, no doubt to the great dismay of many marketing firms.