ITTOL - Lecture 6 - Richards and Beardsley Principles of Literary

I.A. Richards and Monroe Beardsley, in Principles of Literary Criticism
The Critical Tradition: Classic Texts and Contemporary Trends, Third Edition, David H. Richter, Bedford/St. Martin's, Boston, NY, 2007 p 764-74), identify two distinct uses of language (scientific and emotive) which we confuse; and, they assert there are two causes that produce mental processes associated with both usages:
  1. "...the effect of past stimuli associated with them"(764)
  2. "...the organism, its needs, its readiness to respond to this or that stimulus." (764)
There are external and internal stimuli that can trigger a mental event and the character and course of the mental impulse is the result of the interaction of these two sources of stimuli. They use the analogy of a hungry man to explain the difference between (1) and (2). A hungry man's reaction to food is determined by his inner state; his hunger (cause #2). A well-fed man may or may not eat what is given him depending on whether the food brings up pleasant or unpleasant past associations (cause #1)
So far as an impulse owes its character to its stimulus...so far is it a reference...to stand for the property of mental
events which we substitute for thought or cognition. (764)
For a starving man, the impulse to eat is an internal desire; he wants to eat whether or not an external stimulus (food) is available; the stimulus, for him, is an internal state, hunger, and not a reference. For the well-fed man, the food is a reference as the sight of the food stirs up memories of eating, creating an impulse to eat. Where a starving man will eat anything a hungry man will be influenced by both the food and his hunger; if he hates the food he may not eat. As here the food, his past associations with the food, and his hunger all play a role in determining how he reacts to the food, the food is a reference.
...only when the reaction we make to it [the stimulus] tallies with its nature and varies with it in quasi-independence of the uses we make of it does reference occur. (764)
Our natural reaction to food is to eat it; the manner of eating, or not, depends on our own desire or need for food which is quasi-independent of the food itself. When the desire to eat comes solely from our hunger the food does not act as a reference since any food would do. If we are not starving we may see the food in a variety of ways as it invokes various past associations or memories of eating. These past associations distort the reference; we no longer see the food as solely food, the way a starving man would see it; we see it instead as the means to a pleasant or unpleasant experience. And this is true of all stimuli.
Even the most ordinary and familiar objects are perceived as it pleases us to perceive them rather than as they are. (765)
This appears to be another way of saying we have preconceptions about everything; such that virtually every mental impulse we have is the result of both external and internal stimuli and this is true for everything we read as well since written statements can act as references.
We may either use words [written statements] for the sake of the references they promote [scientific language], or we may use them for the sake of the attitude and emotions which ensue [emotive language]. (766)
We can use language scientifically, in which we talk about (reference) real objects; objects that exist and are subject to the laws of nature or, we can use language to invoke (reference) specific emotions that will engender a specific attitude.  When we use language scientifically our references (the statements we make about real objects) must be true and logically connected. This is not the case when we use emotive language; we don't have to be logical or confine our references to statements about real objects; we do, however, have to be emotionally consistent if we hope to produce the desired attitude. Richards and Beardsley claim that we mix up these two uses of language by confusing or entangling references with attitudes; we want our attitudes to be true and so we create fictions and use them as references to support our attitude.  We are most prone to doing this with regards to religion but it occurs in other areas as well.  For the authors, attitudes are real in and of themselves and there is be no need to create "unwarranted beliefs" (fictions as references) in their support. They claim attitude does not need to be "grounded in fact"
...it is still the attitudes not the references which are important. It matters not at all in such cases whether the references are true or false. (766)
They identify three types of Truth in Criticism:
  1. in the scientific sense - something is true if it is real
  2. if it is acceptable within the context of the text i.e. it rings true in the text even though it has no real world counterpart
  3. sincerity - the author has not attempted to create an emotive response that he does not feel himself
A reference can thus be true in a real sense or true to the story or true by being sincere. The last is a bit difficult; they refer to two poems as examples: "Ae fond kiss" by Robbie Burns and Byron's "When we two parted".  Burns poem reads facetiously, Byron's, sincerely. However, Burns poem is sincere in itself; it is melodramatic throughout and invokes a sense of someone sincerely wanting to sever a relationship but pretending that circumstances beyond his control are forcing the severance. Byron's on the other hand invokes a sense of someone who is hurt more by his bruised vanity than his loss of a great love. Of the two, Byron's strikes me as insincere in that it poses as a love poem but displays itself as the venting of emotion. [Although the authors question Burns sincerity in writing the piece as in real life he was trying to sever his relationship with Mrs. Maclehose; which I find odd as this is external evidence and they denounce the use of all "external canons" , including historical fact, in criticizing a text.] The main point they appear to be making is that an attitude can be the result of an experience, the experience of reading, and does not have to be based on a scientific truth. For example, one can develop an attitude toward tragedy, even if they have never experienced tragedy in real life, simply by reading King Lear.  There is no need to create a fictitious personal tragedy to support the attitude, nor is it necessary to believe King Lear was an historical figure. In fact they claim
To...mistake the incitement [emotive language] of an attitude for a statement of fact is a practice which should be discouraged. (774)
The article itself is a response to the Revelation Doctrine  that was in vogue with literary critics of the time. Critics spoke of Beauty, Truth and other altruistic traits as separate realities. Arthur Conan Doyle created rationales for the existence of fairies because he wanted to believe fairies existed. For the authors, such machinations were not only unnecessary but harmful to the art of literature itself as the minute the belief in these supposed realities is punctured any analysis of the piece falls apart. And the justification for these beliefs only encourages authors to write pieces which invoke the belief and not an attitude; such pieces are poor replicas of art, lacking the vibrancy and force of true literature.

Popular posts from this blog

ITTOL - Lecture 6/7 - Brooks, Irony as a Principle of Structure

Notes on Adorno-"History and Freedom"-Lecture 5