Notes on Adorno-"History and Freedom"-Lecture 5
The Totality on the Road to Self-Realization
In this lecture Adorno claims that there is a problem with Hegel's philosophical history. He argues that the idea of history as a "self-realizing totality" [a consolation of philosophy] is irrational because no one benefits from it. It has only survived as long as it has because humanity has survived despite of all the suffering that has been inflicted in the concept's name.The Philosophy of History and Historiography
To "construct" an historical event, we need to know the context, the facts, and how they are connected to each other (39). The process of gathering "the relevant factors" related to "historical events" in order to understand them philosophically both "requires and presupposes historiography [the study of historical texts]" and the process of history-writing to explain them. i.e. in explaining an historical event we rely on historical texts and we create texts for the events we are explaining. The act of historical research is "the philosophy of history proper." And, just as history tends to become philosophy (ideas generated by a study of history), philosophy (the approach we take to studying history) tends to become history (39-40).[T]he philosophical understanding of these [historical] events...moves in the direction of history-writing in the process of explicating them." (39-40)
Inherent Bias - Hegel's Philosophy of History
Hegel claims history is rational but to be rational it has to have a human end given that rationality is "a concept based on an understanding of the self-preservation of the individual" and cui bono applies, someone must always benefit. Hegel, since "he writes his philosophical history from the standpoint of the victor, because he justifies or vindicates the universal as it asserts itself" breaks his own proposal of the dialectic between the universal and the particular; he declares the universal, which is "always a concept or idea" to be the true reality and ignores the consequences of the victims (41-42). In essence, he excludes real human beings from the equation and thus creates an irrational philosophical history.In Defence of Hegel
Adorno says, in Hegel's defence, that he is a realist who "quite straightforwardly wishes to be guided by things as they are" and views the universal as a concept which takes in all the particulars and therefore takes precedence over particulars. However, Hegel's delusion lies in "taking the primacy of the concept, as if it meant the world itself were a concept, a spirit" according to Plato's view of the "universal, the necessary, unity and the good" which are all identified with each other. The main problem is that "once reason has lost its relation to the individuals who are concerned with self-preservation, it degenerates into unreason" (43). The paradox is that while reason projected on a universal becomes unreasonable (as no one benefits) it does not mean the reason of an individual will become unreason. Hegel, as an individual, used reason to arrive at his philosophical history, his mistake was in treating an abstract concept, the universal, as a person. Marx made the same mistake, believing that "ultimately the universal takes over and the concept is victorious, individual's will indeed come into their own--...[ensuring] that all the suffering and the wasted individuality of history will be somehow be made good" (44). Adorno says Ivan Turgenev was "the first to comment...critically" on this by saying "a completely classless society could not console him for the fate of all those who suffered to no purpose" (44).Species-Reason
There is a form of reason that can be held universally, species-reason, which, "by virtue of its universality" already contains a restrictive element "and in certain circumstances this element can develop in such a way as to turn into an injustice on the part of the universal towards the particular...Thus on one side reason can liberate itself from the particularity of obdurate particular interest, on the other side, fail to free itself from the no less obdurate particular interest of the totality" (44-45). In effect, the majority, in the hope of preserving themselves from the designs of random individuals can end up suffering under unjust limits imposed by a small group of individuals thought to be representing the majority.Reason, Unreason, and Domination
According to Horkheimer, "the constitution of humanity as a species amounts to a gigantic public company for the exploitation of nature." The idea of the universal contains a "logical and consistent perversion" that turns the whole (the universal) into a particular. This is what happened with fascist race theory, "like all particulars, this one [fascism] became increasingly intolerant of other particulars." In this way "reason is both reason and unreason in one" (45).Because of this, absolute spirit as the meaning behind history--the consolation of philosophy--that everything is for the good of all--is more apt to be for the good of the few. i.e. world spirit is very likely to have flipped from the universal to a handful of individuals (particulars). Adorno argues that Hegel's view has held for so long as we impute individual self-preservation to the species and since we are still here--we have, as Horkheimer says--dominated nature--there is no point in doubting the concept even though so many have suffered under it.
[Y]ou can only understand the violence inherent in this view of history as a self-realizing totality [as the consolation of philosophy] if you understand that its truth,...,lies in the fact that life and with it the possibility of happiness...would be inconceivable without all the things that can be urged by way of objection to it--its failings towards the individual, and all the senseless suffering and cruelty" (47-48).